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L94Providing adequate incentives to schedule energyprograms accurately is a critical feature of liberalized electricity
markets, particularly those with large shares of intermittent, renewable energy resources. In this regard, two
main regulatory approaches are widely adopted in Europe. The single pricing scheme rewards or penalizes
market agents according to the impact of their individual imbalances on the system imbalance. The dual pricing
scheme penalizes (at best does not reward) all individual energy imbalances. This study theoretically identifies
and then provides supporting empirical evidence of potential inconsistencies between market agents' balancing
responsibility and the economic incentives provided by these pricing rules (de facto, opportunities for arbitrage
in sequentialmarkets). The causal effect of imbalance price regulations on the volumeof the energy imbalances is
investigated by exploiting a quasi-experimental change in regulation in the Italian power system. A difference-
in-differences design provides robust evidence that the volume of intentional imbalances significantly decreases
when moving from a single to dual pricing scheme. We conclude that the economic incentives of a dual pricing
scheme are better alignedwith amarket agent's responsibility to be balanced andworth of further consideration
from a policy perspective.
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In liberalized electricity markets, the task of maintaining a balance
between supply and demand faces new challenges. First, coordination
requirements are no longer in the hands of a single, vertically integrated
company, but shared between the Transmission System Operator
(TSO), managing the transmission network, and market participants.
These have the responsibility to ensure that actual (real-time) electric-
ity injections into (and withdrawals from) the network correspond to
their energy programs – defined ahead of delivery, normally on the
day-ahead market. The duty to balance any residual deviation lays, in
turn, with the TSO, who fulfills this task by resorting to flexible genera-
tion capacity, traded on the balancingmarket – the last, in the temporal
sequence of markets comprising the wholesale power exchange.
Indeed, a second challenge derives from an increasing need forand Fabrizio Iacone as well as
at the Copernicus Institute of
ll as participants at the IAEE
agalli@uu.nl (E. Fumagalli).flexibility, as larger shares of intermittent, renewable generation lower
the predictability of supply and demand side programs. While the cur-
rent energy transition goes in the direction of complying with interna-
tional agreements on climate change, it is also associated with an
increase in the costs directly sustained by TSOs to balance the system,
and indirectly experienced by traditional power producers as they are
called to operate their plants with higher flexibility (e.g., Perez-Arriaga
and Batlle, 2012: Hu et al., 2018). Third, to minimize the residual
balancing needs of power markets it is crucial that the institutional ar-
rangements governing balancing responsibilities provide effective in-
centives for market players to schedule their energy programs
accurately, i.e. in line with their expected production or consumption
levels. In this regard, European rules require that any deviation from
an energy program is settled at a regulated price, reflecting the value
of electricity in real-time (EU, 2017). However, the value of energy in
real-time normally differs from day-ahead market prices, and these ar-
rangements can provide opportunities for arbitrage across prices in se-
quential markets. Consequently, program deviations (energy
imbalances) might not be minimized, potentially leading to higher
balancing costs and, in some cases, to network instabilities
(e.g., Scherer et al., 2015).
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the economic incentives provided by imbalance pricing rules is a contro-
versial economic issue (e.g., van der Veen et al., 2012). Twomain, alterna-
tive pricing rules exist: the single pricing scheme and the dual pricing
scheme. The former rewards or penalizes market agents according to
the impact of their individual programdeviation on the system imbalance
(the residual deviation). The latter penalizes, at best does not reward, all
individual imbalances. Although they have been widely adopted in
Europe for quite some time, a comprehensive assessment of the two is
still lacking. The objective of this paper is to contribute filling this gap, fo-
cusing on the incentive properties of the two pricing schemes in relation
to a market agent's responsibility to be balanced. The Italian electricity
market provides the empirical setting and a change in regulation, from
a single to a dual pricing scheme, creates the ideal environment for a com-
parative assessment (ARERA, 2016a, 2016c).
The majority of existing work exploring imbalance pricing schemes
studies the strategies that amarket agentmight adopt to exploit arbitrage
opportunities in a specific market setting (Boogert and Dupont, 2005;
Wawer, 2007; Möller et al., 2011; Scherer et al., 2015; Haring et al.,
2015; and Just andWeber, 2015). By simulating a number of these poten-
tial strategies against a set of real (or test) market data, these papers
unanimously suggest that an agent's programming decision is potentially
drivennot only by her responsibility to be balanced, but also by the incen-
tives embedded in local (and neighboring) market design.1 Only two of
the papers in this literature stream specifically focus on assessing com-
parative advantages and disadvantages of imbalance pricing schemes
(Vandezande et al., 2010; van der Veen et al., 2012). Although they
adopt rather different methodologies (simple numerical examples and
agent-based modelling, respectively) both contributions identify a single
pricing scheme as the best choice from an economic efficiency perspec-
tive. When the alternatives are compared on the basis of effectiveness,
i.e., the accuracy of the energy programs, only van der Veen et al.
(2012) recommend the implementation of a dual pricing scheme and
only in case of scarcity of flexible resources.
The present work contributes to this literature in several ways. First,
we introduce a comprehensive theoretical framework encompassing
the two main imbalance pricing rules and derive how they (differently)
affect an economic agent's payoff and programming decision. Second,
we show that the economic incentives provided by the imbalance
pricing rules affect in a statistically significant way the programming de-
cisions taken by market participants. To study the causal effect of price
regulation on the volume of energy imbalances, we propose an original
empirical strategy, based on a Difference in Differences (DiD) design. In
our setting, the actual imbalance volume is benchmarked to the TSO fore-
casting error. As the latter captures the stochastic component of the im-
balance, the difference between the actual imbalance and the
forecasting error captures, in turn, the volume of the intentional imbal-
ance (the strategic over- and under-scheduling in the programming
stage). In practice, we exploit the quasi-experimental regulatory reform
occurred in July 2016 when ARERA, the Italian national Regulatory
Authority for Energy, Networks and the Environment, shifted the settle-
ment rules of consumption sites from a single to a dual pricing scheme
(ARERA, 2016a, 2016c). In sum, consistently with our theoretical frame-
work, we provide robust evidence that while the actual imbalance was1 While Boogert and Dupont (2005) find that the potential profit that would results
from strategic under/over scheduling in the Dutch market is rarely positive, both Wawer
(2007) andMöller et al. (2011) shows that a Balance Responsible Party submitting ‘biased
schedules’ would expect positive payoffs in the German market (both markets applied a
single pricing mechanism at the time of the research). Expanding the analysis of potential
strategies to include prices on neighboringmarkets, Scherer et al. (2015) show that the in-
terplay between rules for cross-border trading andnational imbalance pricing (a dual pric-
ing scheme) create good profit opportunities for Swiss Balance Responsible Parties willing
to act strategically. Differently, Haring et al. (2015) propose an original imbalance settle-
ment scheme (different from those currently used in Europe)which responds to a number
of specific objectives. Among other things, the authors are concernedwith limiting oppor-
tunities for price-related strategies and the subsequent reduction of market liquidity (and
increased opportunities to exercise market power).significantly higher than the TSO forecasting error during the single pric-
ing regime, the difference between the two significantly decreased after
the implementation of a dual pricing rule. This suggests that the size of
the intentional imbalance significantly decreased after the regulatory re-
form. To the best of our knowledge, this is thefirst studyfinding empirical
evidence on the differential impact of alternative pricing rules on market
agents' imbalance strategies.
Notwithstanding the regulatory preference for single pricing
schemes (EU, 2017), the observation that the economic incentives of a
dual pricing scheme are better aligned with a market agent's responsi-
bility to be balanced is certainly worth of consideration for multiple
reasons: intentional imbalances shift economic transactions from a
more liquid and competitive day-ahead market to a highly concen-
trated and more volatile balancing market; alleged abuses have been
contested to market participants profiting, more largely than expected,
from imbalance settlements (Scherer et al., 2015; Just and Weber,
2015; ARERA, 2016b); and, more generally, the design of electricity
markets is being gradually revised to account not only for larger share
of renewable energy resources, but also more active demand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2describes
the conceptual framework for imbalance settlements, introduces the the-
oretical model, and formulates two propositions to be tested empirically.
The dataset and the empirical strategy are introduced in Section 3. Results
and related robustness checks are presented in Section 4 and Section 5,
respectively. Section 6 concludes and derives policy implications.
2. Imbalance drivers: a conceptual framework
According to Europeannorms, the balancing responsibility of amarket
participant can be exercised directly or, asmore commonly happens, via a
Balance Responsible Party (BRP), an ad hoc market entity managing a
portfolio of consumption and/or generation sites (EU, 2017). When im-
balances occur, the TSO has the duty: i) to balance the market in real-
time by procuring flexible resources in a so-called Balancing Market
(BM); and ii) to settle, ex-post, the imbalances of the BRPs.
In real-time, amarket is shortwhen, on aggregate, the actual level of
power generation is lower than the actual level of consumption. In this
case, the TSO balances the market by purchasing, on the BM, an extra-
amount of energy, at the Upward Price (pUP). This is normally higher
than the Day-Ahead (DA) market price (pDA), as it reflects not only
the increasing marginal cost of production, but also a premium for the
flexibility of the generators. Therefore, a market imbalance generates a
‘system cost’ (for the same extra-amount of energy, end-users would
have paid a lower price on the day-ahead). In the opposite, longmarket
case, the actual level of power generation is, on aggregate, higher than
the actual level of consumption. To balance the market, the TSO sells
back the excess of energy to flexible generators, at the Downward
Price (pDN). As this is normally lower than the price paid on the DA,
the market imbalance still generates a ‘system cost’ (end-users are not
made whole for the energy not consumed).
BRP's imbalances are settled ex-post via the imbalance fee, product of
the BRP's imbalance volume times the imbalance price. For each time
unit, the imbalance volume of a BRP responsible, for instance, for a num-
ber of consumption sites, is defined as the deviation of the BRP's actual
level of consumption from the energy purchased in the programming
stage, normally on the DA market.2 As such, the BRP's imbalance can
be positive or negative.3 The imbalance price is designed to reflect the2 The focus of our empirical work is on the behavior ofmarket agents (traders) purchas-
ing electricity on the wholesale market and reselling it to end-users in the retail market,
hence the emphasis on BRPs responsible for consumption sites. Notably, the role of the de-
mand in liberalized electricity markets is at the center of the latest package of proposals
presented by the European Commission in November 2016 (EU, 2016). Nevertheless,
we expect the results of our empirical analysis to hold also for BRPs responsible for non-
programmable production units.
3 In the reminder of the paper, a BRP's imbalance is also referred to as the ‘individual’
imbalance, to distinguish it from the market (or system) imbalance.
Table 1
Imbalance fee under the single pricing scheme.
Individual long position
or positive imbalance
(imbi N 0)
Individual short position
or negative imbalance
(imbi b 0)
Short market (negative sign) | imbi |·max (pDA; pUP) | imbi |·max (pDA; pUP)
Long market (positive sign) | imbi |·min (pDA; pDN) | imbi |·min (pDA; pDN)
Table 2
Payoffs associated to the single pricing scheme.
Individual long position
or positive imbalance
(imbi N 0)
Individual short position
or negative imbalance
(imbi b 0)
Short market (negative sign) | imbi |·(−pDA pUP) N 0 | imbi |·(pDA − pUP) b 0
Long market (positive sign) | imbi |·(−pDA pDN) b 0 | imbi |·(pDA − pDN) N 0
Table 3
Imbalance fee under the dual pricing scheme.
Individual long position
or positive imbalance
(imbi N 0)
Individual short position
or negative imbalance
(imbi b 0)
Short market (negative sign) | imbi |·pDA | imbi |·max (pDA; pUP)
Long market (positive sign) | imbi |·min (pDA; pDN) | imbi |·pDA
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Balancing Market (EU, 2017). More specifically, two main alternative
imbalance pricing rules – the single pricing scheme and the dual pricing
scheme – are applied in Europeanmarkets today. Herewedescribe their
core features.
2.1. Single pricing scheme
According to the single pricing scheme, the imbalance price depends
on the sign of themarket imbalance (Table 1).4 A negative sign points to
a short market, that is a prevalence of individual, negative imbalances
(imbi, with i= 1…n, for n BRPs in the market). In this case, the imbal-
ance price is the maximum between the price on the DA market, pDA,
and the Upward Price, pUP, on the BM. When the sign is positive (long
market, caused by a prevalence of individual positive imbalances), the
imbalance price is the minimum between the DA price, pDA, and the
Downward Price, pDN, on the BM.
Note that a BRP's individual short position entails the payment of the
imbalance fee to the TSO,while the opposite occurs in case of an individ-
ual long position. Also, it is important to observe that the following
relation holds among prices:
pDN ≤pDA≤pUP ð1Þ
Day-ahead market prices are normally higher than downward
prices and normally lower than upward prices. With this in mind,
Table 2 shows how the single pricing scheme affects the payoff of
the economic agents (the BRPs). This scheme leads to a negative
payoff when individual imbalances exhibit the same sign of the
market imbalance: agents are penalized because they increase the
size of the market imbalance and the related system costs.
Conversely, the single pricing scheme rewards economic agents
when their individual imbalances are opposite in sign to the mar-
ket imbalance. Indeed, individual imbalances opposing the market
imbalance lower the size of the market imbalance and the related
system costs.
In sum, the single pricing scheme can be classified as a market-
oriented regulation which, by rewarding or penalizing market agents
according to the impact of their imbalances on the system, provides
incentives to reduce the system imbalance (profits can be made by
helping the system maintain its balance). Also, it is a cost-reflective
mechanism which passes through to the individual economic agents
the costs or benefits associated to their imbalances.5
2.2. Dual pricing scheme
According to the dual pricing scheme, an individual long position is
settled at a price not higher than the day-ahead price, while an individ-
ual short position is settled at a price not lower than the day-aheadprice
(Table 3).With this, individual imbalances increasing themarket imbal-
ance are still penalized (as in the single pricing scheme) while individ-
ual imbalances opposing themarket imbalance are no longer rewarded,
in spite of their positive role in mitigating the size of the market imbal-
ance and the related system costs.4 That is, for a given sign of the market imbalance, the same price applies to BRPs,
irrespectively on whether their imbalance is positive or negative.
5 From the point of view of the TSO, the economic transactions pertaining to imbalance
settlements can result in a positive or negative net cash flow. Similarly, also the economic
transactions on the BMcan result in a positive or negative net cashflow. The algebraic sum
of these two net cash flows is socialized via the transmission tariff, paid by end-users. The-
oretically, under a single pricing scheme, this algebraic sum equals to zero. Although, this
rarely occurs in practice (imbalance pricing schemes are often slightlymore complex than
described here and TSOs' procurements on the BM are not limited to balancing actions in
real-time), the single pricing rule is considered economically efficient from this perspec-
tive, i.e. resulting in a zero-sum game for tariff payers (Vandezande et al., 2010).Table 4 illustrates the agents' payoffs associated to the dual pricing
scheme. When the individual imbalance shows the same sign of the
market imbalance, the dual pricing scheme works exactly as the single
pricing scheme and the agents' payoffs are negative.6 Conversely,
when the individual imbalance shows an opposite sign with respect to
the market imbalance, the imbalance price equals the day-ahead price
and the related individual payoffs are equal to zero.
In this respect, a dual pricing scheme can be thought as a command-
and-control type regulation: individual imbalances are always penal-
ized (at best not rewarded), irrespectively of their impact on the system
imbalance and cost. This is the main reason why incentives stemming
from the dual pricing scheme are thought to be economically sub-
optimal compared to those provided by the single pricing scheme.
2.3. Imbalance drivers under the single and dual pricing schemes
In this sub-section, we present an extension of the theoretical
model by Just and Weber (2015) and study how the two alternative
imbalance pricing rules affect the economic agents' programming
strategies on the day-ahead (their choice of the bidding quantity).7
The model is described from the point of view of market agents pur-
chasing electricity on the wholesale market and reselling it to their
own clients in the retail market (i.e., BRPs managing a portfolio of
consumption sites).
The quantity of energy, qiDA, purchased on the day-ahead, in a given
time unit (the hour), by market agent i, equals:
qDAi ¼ qRTLi þ imbi ð2Þ
where qiRTL is the amount of energy actually consumed by the agent's
retail clients. We assume this energy amount to be exogenous, since
the bidder strategy on the DA cannot affect its clients' actual level6 The imbalance price is: i) themaximum between the upward balancing price and the
day-ahead price in case of a negative imbalance within a short market; and ii) the mini-
mumbetween the downward balancing price and the day-ahead price in case of a positive
imbalance within a long market.
7 Without loss of generality, we intentionally leave out of the economic transactions oc-
curring on the intra-day market.
Table 4
Payoffs associated to the dual pricing scheme.
Individual long position
or positive imbalance
(imbi N 0)
Individual short position
or negative imbalance
(imbi b 0)
Short market (negative sign) | imbi |·(−pDA pDA) = 0 | imbi |·(pDA − pUP) b 0
Long market (positive sign) | imbi |·(−pDA pDN) b 0 | imbi |·(pDA − pDA) = 0
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expressed as:
imbi ¼ σi þ xi ð3Þ
For each bidder, the volume of imbalances is the result of a stochastic
deviation,σi, around the expected level of consumption, E(qiRTL), and of a
strategic decision, xi, regarding the energy purchased on the day-ahead.
The former is a pure forecasting error originating from the sequential
structure of the power exchange. The actual level of consumption can
deviate from the amount purchased in the day-ahead market due to
exogenous, unpredictable events such as weather conditions, so it is
stochastic from the perspective of the bidder. The latter derives from
the economic incentives provided by the regulatory framework
governing imbalance settlements and enters the objective function of
a bidder as a decision variable. Indeed, when submitting a purchase
bid, a profit maximizing agent might intentionally decide to purchase
an amount of energy which deviates from the expected level of
consumption (i.e., qiDA = E(qiRTL) xi). We define such a deviation, xi, an
intentional imbalance.
The total demand purchased in the day-ahead market (QDA) is:
QDA ¼
Xn
i¼1
qDAi ¼
Xn
i¼1
qRTLi þ imbi
  ð4Þ
and it follows the cumulative distribution function F(QDA), which we
assume to be normal consistently with previous literature (e.g., Hodge
et al., 2013).8
Each bidder choses the optimal level of intentional imbalances
maximizing its expected profits, E(πi). Revenues result from selling
electricity, qiRTL, in the retail market at the price pRTL, which we assume,
without loss of generality, to be defined in advance. Costs result from
the energy purchased on the day-ahead market, qiDA, at the day-ahead
price and from settling any eventual imbalance at the imbalance price,
pIMB, which varies depending on the imbalance settlement rule.
Expected profits are expressed as:
E πið Þ ¼ qRTLi pRTL−qDAi E pDA
 
þ imbiE pIMB
  ð5Þ
In other words, bidders schedule their purchasing program accord-
ing to the expected value of, respectively, the day-ahead, E(pDA), and
the imbalance price, E(pIMB). Both prices are assumed to be exogenous,
as the demand-side of the market is competitive and no agent has
sufficient market power to unilaterally influence market prices.
We assume risk-neutrality. Bidders are indifferent whether to make
an intentional imbalance whenever E(pDA) = E(pIMB). Conversely,
a potential for arbitrage among prices in sequential markets arises
whenever the condition E(pDA) = E(pIMB) is no longer valid. In this
latter case, bidders evaluate whether to over or under-schedule their
purchasing program in the day-ahead market.8 Assuming that all market agents are capable to forecast the demand of their clients on
average correctly, and that the forecast error is normally distributed, the actual demand in
the market is normally distributed.We also assume that economic agents formulate their bidding strat-
egies under uncertainty, that is without knowing the direction of the
market imbalance. However, they attribute a certain probability of the
market being long F(QDA) or short (1 − F(QDA)).
Under the single pricing scheme, the expected imbalance price
equals:
E pIMB
  ¼ F QDA  E pDN þ 1−F QDA  E pUP  ð6Þ
In this case, imbalances are settled at the downward balancing price,
pDN, when the market is long, while the upward balancing price, pUP,
applies when the market is short.
After replacing Eqs. (2) and (6) into Eq. (5), we derive the first order
conditions of the expected profits, leading to the following optimal level
of imbalances:
imbi ¼ 1
φ QDA
  E pUP −E pDA 
E pUPð Þ−E pDNð Þ −ɸ QDA
  !
ð7Þ
With φ(∙) andɸ(∙) being respectively the probability density function
(PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard-
ized normal distribution.
Eq. (7) provides interesting insights on how the structure of the
single pricing scheme affects bidding incentives. Indicating with y the
right-hand side of Eq. (7), we observe that a higher probability of
the system being long obviously lowers the incentive to over-schedule
in the day-ahead
 
∂y
∂ɸðQDAÞ b 0
!
. Conversely, the incentive to over-
schedule in the day-ahead increases with both upward and downward
prices
 
∂y
∂EðpUPÞ N0;
∂y
∂EðpDNÞ N0
!
, while it decreases with the day-ahead
price
 
∂y
∂EðpDAÞ b 0
!
. Indeed, under a single pricing scheme an increase
of the upward balancing price increases both the advantage of a long
position (selling the extra energy occurs at a higher price) and the dis-
advantage of a short position (purchasing the energy shortage becomes
costlier). Similarly, a higher downward price lowers both the advantage
of a short position (purchasing the energy shortage becomes costlier)
and the disadvantage of a long position (selling the extra energy occurs
at a higher price). This suggests that an increase in both upward and
downward balancing prices creates incentives for over-scheduling in
the programming stage. Finally, when the day-ahead price increases,
purchasing energy on the day-ahead becomes relatively more expen-
sive, thus decreasing the benefit of a long position.
While the same reasoning applies for the incentives to under-
schedule in the day-ahead market (taking the opposite sign for all
variables), we state our first proposition taking the over-scheduling
perspective.
Proposition 1. Under the single pricing scheme, the economic incentives
to intentionally over-schedule in the day-ahead market (to take a long
position) increase with both the expected downward and upward
balancing prices, and decrease with the expected day-ahead price and
with the probability of the market imbalance being positive.
Under the dual pricing scheme, the imbalance price varies depend-
ing on whether the bidder's imbalance is positive or negative, and it
respectively equals:
E pIMBjimbiN0
  ¼ F QDA  E pDN þ 1−F QDA  E pDA 
E pIMBjimbib0
  ¼ F QDA  E pDA þ 1−F QDA  E pUP 
8><
>: ð8Þ
9 Two remarks are in order. First, aggregation results in netting individual positive and
negative imbalances, and represents a conservative estimation of the individual imbalance
volumes. Second, the change in the imbalance price regulation applied only to BRPs re-
sponsible for consumption sites. Hence, our main focus is on demand-side imbalances.
Nevertheless, among the robustness checks we consider a dependent variable which in-
cludes supply-side imbalances from intermittent renewable resources as well.
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can be written as:
E πijimbiN0ð Þ ¼ qRTLi pRTL−E pDA
  
þ imbi F QDA
 
E pDN
 
−E pDA
  h i
E πijimbib0ð Þ ¼ qRTLi pRTL−E pDA
  
− j imbi j 1−F QDA
  
E pUP
 
−E pDA
  
8><
>:
ð9Þ
By comparing the expected profits associated to a long vs. a short
position, we first determine the condition under which the former
yields higher expected profits than the latter:
E πijimbiN0ð ÞNE πijimbib0ð Þ→
E pUP
 
−E pDA
 
E pUPð Þ−E pDNð Þ −ɸ QDA
 
N0 ð10Þ
From condition (10), we derive that the incentives to over-schedule
in the day-ahead increase with the upward and downward balancing
prices, while they decreasewith the day-ahead price andwith the prob-
ability of observing a positive market imbalance. In this regard, the eco-
nomic incentives stemming from market variables are consistent
between the single and the dual pricing scheme.
Next, by maximizing the expected profits associated to a long and
short position, we determine the optimal level of imbalances:
∂E πijimbiN0ð Þ
∂xi
¼ 0→imbi ¼ −
ɸ QDA 
φ QDA
  ∂E πijimbib0ð Þ
∂xi
¼ 0→imbi ¼
1−ɸ QDA 
φ QDA
 
8<
:
ð11Þ
By comparing Eqs. (7) and (11), it is immediate to verify that the
optimal level of both positive and negative imbalances is always
smaller under the dual pricing scheme than under the single pricing
scheme. Indeed, the dual pricing scheme either penalizes or does not
reward imbalances, thus making it unprofitable to intentionally
increase their volume – as illustrated in Eq. (9), under the dual
pricing scheme profit maximization implies a minimization of
individual imbalances. This brings us to the second proposition to
be verified empirically.
Proposition 2. The economic incentives to intentionally over- and under-
schedule in the day-ahead market (to increase the imbalance volume), are
lower under the dual pricing scheme than under the single pricing scheme.
3. Data and empirical strategy
In this section, we introduce the data set and the empirical strategy
employed to test the validity of the two propositions derived from the
theoretical model. The use of data for the Italian Power Exchange
(IPEX) represents an ideal choice because of the 2016 regulatory reform.
Specifically, on June 16th, 2016 the Italian regulator published a consul-
tation document on its intention to comprehensively redesign the
institutional arrangements governing imbalance settlements, also in
view of the concomitant, European-wide discussion on the Balancing
Guidelines (ARERA, 2016a; EU, 2017). Moreover, on June 24th, 2016 a
public procedure was launched, adopting sanctioningmeasures against
a number of BRPs that had showed unusual imbalance positions
(ARERA, 2016b). Shortly after that, on August 1st, 2016, the regulator
replaced the ten-year old single pricing scheme, which applied to
BRPs managing consumption sites (and intermittent, renewable gener-
ation resources), with a mixed single-dual pricing scheme (ARERA,
2006; ARERA, 2016c). Within this new regime, imbalance volumes
inside a tolerance band (individual imbalances smaller than ±15% of
the scheduled energy withdrawals) remained subject to the single
pricing scheme. A dual pricing scheme began to apply, instead, to imbal-
ance volumes outside the tolerance band. In the following, we refer
to this modification as the ‘regulatory reform’. The first of a series ofchanges, this reform regarded exclusively the consumption sites,
while exempting intermittent, renewable generation resources.
The geographical scope chosen for the empirical strategy is the
so-called macro-zone. For imbalance settlement purposes, Italy is
divided in two macro-zones: macro-zone North coincides with the
energy market zone North while macro-zone South encompasses the
rest of the country. In Section 4, we focus the attention on the macro-
zone South (robustness checks are developed for the macro-zone
North in Section 5).
As for the temporal scope of the analysis, the first proposition,
concerning bidding incentives under the single pricing scheme, is tested
on hourly data from January 1st, 2015 to July 31th, 2016. The empirical
strategy for this pre-reform period is described in Section 3.1. The
second proposition, concerning the different volume of imbalances
under the two imbalance pricing schemes, is tested by considering
data in both the pre- and post-reform periods (January 1st, 2015 –
May 31th, 2017). The empirical strategy for this analysis is described
in Section 3.2.
3.1. Imbalance drivers under the single pricing scheme
In studying the economic incentives to over-schedule in the
day-ahead market, the main variable of interest is the hourly volume
of demand-side imbalances registered in the macro-zone South.
Since micro-data on actual consumption are not publicly available,
the hourly volume of demand-side imbalances is estimated at
macro-zonal level.9 Specifically, the macro-zonal, aggregate volume
(in MWh) of demand-side imbalances observed in hour t, IMBt, is
computed as the difference between the scheduled energy consump-
tion, QtSDL, and the actual energy consumption, QtRTL, in the same
time-geographical scope:
IMBt ¼ QSDLt −QRTLt ð12Þ
Hourly data on the actual level of consumption,QtACT, at an aggregate
macro-zonal level, are made freely available by the Italian TSO. The
hourly amounts of energy purchased in the programming stage are, in-
stead, available at a firm-level and freely downloadable from the IPEX's
website. Therefore, scheduled consumption is first estimated at a firm
level, qt, iSDL, and then aggregated as specified in Eq. (13):
QSDLt ¼
Xn
i¼1
qSDLt;i ¼
Xn
i¼1
qDAt;i þ
X5
ID¼1
Xn
i¼1
qIDt;i;buy−q
ID
t;i;sell
 
ð13Þ
For each firm i, with i = 1,… n, the hourly purchasing bids accepted
in the day-aheadmarket, qt, iDA, are adjustedwith the relatednet purchas-
ing position, qt, i, buyID − qt, i, sellID , in each of the 5 Intra-Day (ID=1,....5)mar-
ket sessions. Firm-level consumption programs are then aggregated at
the macro-zonal level.
In the following econometric model, the macro-zonal, aggregate
volume of demand-side imbalances (in short, the ‘demand-side
imbalance’) is explained by the relevant market variables identified in
the theoretical model:
IMBt ¼ α þ P0t−24β þ γSIGNt−24 þ δTFEt þ X0μ þ εt ð14Þ
P is a vector of hourlymarket prices (in €/MWh) and includes: i) the
day-ahead national purchasing price, pDA, retrieved from the IPEX's
website; and ii) the weighted average of the Upward, pUP, and
Table 5
Unit root tests.
Variable ADF in levels PPERRON in levels
Macro-zone South
IMBz – Demand-side imbalance (MWh) −24.2⁎⁎⁎ −27.2⁎⁎⁎
pDA – Day-Ahead price (€/MWh) −22.4⁎⁎⁎ −27.1⁎⁎⁎
pUP – Upward price (€/MWh) −57.7⁎⁎⁎ −76.8⁎⁎⁎
pDN – Downward price (€/MWh) −46.43⁎⁎⁎ −72.4⁎⁎⁎
TFE – Temperature forecasting error (°C) −32.3⁎⁎⁎ −31.2⁎⁎⁎
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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and made publicly available by the Italian TSO.10
SIGNt is a binary variable indicating the sign of the macro-zonal im-
balance for each hour. A value equal to 1 points to a positivemacro-zone
imbalance and a value equal to 0 to a negative one. Hourly information
on the macro-zonal imbalance sign is made publicly available by the
Italian TSO.
Note that for the market prices and the imbalance sign, 24-hour
lagged values are adopted as a proxy for market agents' expectations.
The underlying idea is that agents build their expectations by observing
the market clearing equilibrium in the same hour of the day before.
The Temperature Forecasting Error (in degree Celsius), TFE, is intro-
duced in themodel, among the control variables, to capture the stochas-
tic component of the macro-zonal imbalance. This variable is computed
as the difference between the actual temperature and the temperature
forecasted on the day-ahead for each of the sixmarket zones composing
the Italian market. Both actual and forecasted temperatures are esti-
mated hourly at the zonal level, as the average of the temperature in
the main cities, weighted by their population.
X is a vector of time fixed effects (year, month, day of the week and
hour, hereby YMDH) to control for potential trends and seasonality
within the year. An additional dummy variable was introduced to iden-
tify hours which experience peaks in electricity demand (for example,
hours that were exceptionally hot or cold).11
Before proceeding with the empirical analysis, we performed the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979; Phillips and Perron, 1988) to check for the
presence of a unit root in the main variables (Table 5). The number of
lags in each test was chosen using the Akaike's information criterion
and the Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (Akaike, 1974;
Schwarz, 1978). Results of the two tests always pointed to the same
direction and do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Hence, we
take the series to be non-stationary. To address this problem, we adopt
the variance estimator of Newey-West (1987) which allows obtaining
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors.3.2. Impact of the regulatory change on imbalance volumes: a DiD design
To studywhether imbalance pricing schemes differentially affect the
bidding decisions of market agents, we design a DiD quasi-experiment.
Specifically,we testwhether thedemand-side imbalance is affected by a
change in the imbalance price regulation,while controlling for the TSO's
load forecasting error (TSOFE).
The intuition behind this choice is the following. Energy imbalances
include an intentional and a stochastic component. In line with the
theoretical model, we expect the former to be affected by the imbalance
pricing rule and to be larger in volume under a single than a dual pricing
scheme. The latter derives, instead, from errors in forecasting actual
consumption, also due to exogenous, unpredictable events such as
weather conditions.
We claim that the stochastic component of the demand-side imbal-
ance can be suitably captured by the forecasting error made by the TSO
(TSOFEt) in estimating the electricity consumption for each hour of the
following day.12 As the TSO forecasts the hourly energy consumption10 The Italian regulation uses average balancing prices because the pricing rule on the
Italian BM is pay-as-bid. Accepted quantities for each price level are used as weights.
11 We consider an hour to be an outlier when the demand is N3.6 times the residuals'
standard deviation, in absolute value – a rule of thumb similar to the one used in Juselius
(2006). The inclusion of this dummy variable does not affect our results.
12 We construct this variable as the difference between the TSO electricity consumption
forecast and the corresponding level of actual electricity consumption, both data being
available from the TSO's website. The forecasted consumption is estimated by the TSO
using consolidated algorithms which account for historical data, expectedweather condi-
tions and network losses. Socio-economic events capable to influence the demand for
electricity and known in advance, such as city holidays, strikes of particular production
categories, television programs of particular interest are also considered (Terna, 2005).to optimize grid operations, such control variable is unaffected by the
imbalance price regulation (the treatment) but is otherwise driven by
the same, exogenous factors which influence the stochastic component
of the demand-side imbalance.
In the empirical application, the stochastic component of the
demand-side imbalance (treated group) is captured by the pre and
post-treatment trend of the TSOFE (control group). In turn, this permits
to isolate the intentional component of the demand-side imbalance and
to assess how its volume is affected by the regulatory change.
We first compare the evolution of the demand-side imbalance in the
macro-zone Southwith the TSO's load forecasting error, before and after
the regulatory reform. The trends of the demand-side imbalance and of
the TSO forecasting error are compared using hourly data for the entire
observation period (01/01/2015–31/05/2017) in Fig. 1, and for a
narrower period (01/04/2016–30/09/2016) in Fig. 2, where daily aver-
age data are employed.13 Similarly, the descriptive statistics, reported
in Table 6 for all variables, are provided separately for the pre- and
post-reform periods.
Figs. 1 and 2 provide graphical evidence of a reduction in the
demand-side imbalance volume and its convergence towards the level
of the TSO's load forecasting error, after the regulatory reform. The
descriptive statistics reported in Table 6 suggest that the reduction of
the difference between the two variables, i.e., of the size of the inten-
tional imbalances, observed in the post-reform period is not driven by
any significant change in the identified, potential imbalance drivers.
Moreover, this trend is consistent with Proposition 2: after the regula-
tory reform was implemented, the demand-side imbalance converges
towards the TSO's load forecasting error and show similar volumes
and trend.
In sum, we suggest that the DiD estimator is unbiased if the treated-
control difference is relevant only in the pre-treatment period, and not
in the post-treatment period. The model employed to test it is specified
in the following way:
DVt ¼ α þ βTREATEDt þ γREG CHANGEt þ δDIF Ft þ ρTFEt þ P0t−24σ
þ τSIGNt−24 þ X0μ þ εt ð15Þ
TREATED is a dichotomy variable taking the value 1 when the obser-
vation refers to the treated group and 0 when it refers to the control
group. In the former case the dependent variable (DVt) corresponds to
the demand-side imbalance, IMBt, while in the latter case it corresponds
to the TSO's load forecasting error, TSOFEt.
REG_CHANGE is another binary variable equaling 1 after the regula-
tory reform and zero otherwise.
The variable DIFF is obtained from the interaction of the TREATED
and REG_CHANGE binary variables. It captures the impact of the change
in regulation on the treated group.
Themodel also includes the expected drivers of the imbalance – the
temperature forecasting error, TFE, the vector P of expected market13 While the regulatory reform effectively entered into force on August 1st, 2016, the
date of June 16th, 2016 is highlighted Figs. 1 and 2. This is when the consultation docu-
ment was published.
Fig. 2. Demand-side imbalances and TSO's load forecasting error before and after the
publication of the consultation document on the regulatory reform – Daily average data
(01/01/2016-31/12/2016) – Macro-zone South.
Fig. 1. Demand-side imbalance and TSO's load forecasting error before and after the
publication of the consultation document on the regulatory reform – Hourly data (01/
01/2015-31/05/2017) – Macro-zone South.
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well as a vector X of time fixed effects.
Wefirst run a pooled regressionwhere theNewey-West estimator is
adopted to ensure heteroskedastic and auto-correlation consistent esti-
mators. We next run a panel regression with fixed effects to control for
unobserved heterogeneity or for factorswhich change over timebut not
across groups.
4. Empirical results
This section reports the results of our empirical investigation. We
first analyze the drivers of the demand-side imbalance under the single
pricing scheme, by estimating the model presented in Section 3.1.
Estimates of Eq. (14) are reported in Table 7. The estimated coeffi-
cients are highly significant and their signs confirm the prediction of
our theoreticalmodel. Consistentwith Proposition 1, the volume of pos-
itive, demand-side imbalances increases when both the upward and
downward balancing prices are expected to increase, while it decreases
with an expected increase in day-ahead prices andwith the expectation
of observing a positive macro-zonal imbalance sign. These results fully
support our intuition that the economic incentives provided by theimbalance pricing scheme are significant for the programming deci-
sions. This suggests that market agents adapt their bidding strategies
on the day-ahead to take into account, not only their expected energy
needs, but also the potential arbitrage opportunities stemming from
price differentials in subsequent markets. Notably, it is rational for eco-
nomic agents to over-schedule in the day-ahead market when increas-
ing upward (downward) prices and decreasing day-ahead market
prices are expected. Within a short market, higher upward prices am-
plify both the advantage of an individual long position and the disad-
vantage of an individual short position (the agent respectively
anticipates to sell back the extra energy at a higher price and to pur-
chase the energy shortage at a higher price). Similarly, within a long
market, higher downward prices reduce both the disadvantage of an in-
dividual long position and the advantage of an individual short position
(the agent respectively anticipates to sell back the extra energy at a
higher price and to purchase the energy shortage at a higher price).
Secondly, we empirically test our DiD design, by estimating the
model presented in Section 3.2. First, a pooled OLS with Newey-West
SE is implemented. Column (1) of Table 8 presents the main results
without control variables, while all other specifications include progres-
sively the full set of control variables. All estimates of our variable of in-
terest are statistically significant and confirm that the regulatory reform
affected the demand-side imbalance. The difference between the
demand-side imbalance and the TSO's load forecasting error in the
macro-zone South was significantly higher under a single pricing
scheme than under a mixed single-dual pricing scheme. This suggests
that the discrepancy between an agent's balancing responsibility and
the economic incentives provided by the imbalance pricing rule is
significantly mitigated by the dual pricing scheme.
In particular, the empirical analysis shows that the coefficient of the
variable TREATED, i.e., the pre-treatment intercept of the treated group,
is positive and statistically significant (statistically different from the in-
tercept of the control group). This indicates a positive and significant di-
vergence of the demand-side imbalance from the TSO's load forecasting
error in the pre-reform period.
The coefficient of the variable DIFF, i.e. the post-treatment intercept
of the treated group, measures to what extent the demand-side
imbalance varied after the treatment and measures the related impact
of the regulatory change. This coefficient is negative and statistically sig-
nificant, indicating that the regulatory reform induced a reduction of the
volume of the demand-side imbalance which, in the post-treatment
period shares a common trend with the TSO's load forecasting error.
These results are confirmed also after the inclusion in the model of
the other control variables, whose coefficients are consistent with the
results presented in Table 7.
In Table 9, we show that the main results are confirmed when the
coefficients are estimated using a panel model with fixed effects. The
coefficient of the TREATED variable is omitted as this variable does not
vary over time, while the coefficient of the DIFF variable is again
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the volume of the
demand-side imbalance decreased after the regulatory change.
5. Robustness checks
In this section, we present a variety of robustness checks to exclude
the possibility of our main results being dependent on the chosen
empirical strategy. Specifically, we show that results are robust to
alternative specifications of the explanatory variables, of the dependent
variable and of the chosen estimator. Robustness checks have been run
with respect to both empirical analyses.
Hereby, we focus on the first empirical model (presented in
Section 3.1) where we investigate the determinants of the demand-
side imbalances under the single pricing scheme. A first potential criti-
cism regards the choice to use a 24-hour lag as a proxy of the prices
and imbalance sign's expectations. To exclude the possibility that our
results depend on this choice, or on the model linearity, we run again
Table 6
Descriptive statistics for the macro-zone South.
(Source: own elaboration on GME's and Terna's data.)
N. obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-reform (01/01/2015–31/07/2016)
IMB – Demand-side imbalance (MWh) 13,870 285.01 1262.50 −4824.30 4585.16
TSOFE – TSO's load forecasting error (MWh) 13,870 19.38 556.66 −5855.00 3637.00
SIGN –Imbalance sign (binary) 13,870 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
pDA – Day-Ahead price (€/MWh) 13,870 47.00 14.00 5.62 144.57
pUP – Upward price (€/MWh) 13,870 108.26 70.44 0.00 792.27
pDN – Downward price (€/MWh) 13,870 11.86 10.53 0.00 96.92
TFE – Temperature forecasting error (°C) by market zone
South 13,870 0.05 0.38 −2.50 3.60
Centre-South 13,870 −0.02 0.49 −3.20 3.90
Centre-North 13,870 −0.04 0.47 −3.10 2.60
Sardinia 13,870 −0.03 0.41 −2.50 2.20
Sicily 13,870 −0.09 0.38 −2.10 2.20
Post-reform (01/08/2016–31/05/2017)
IMB – Demand-side imbalance (MWh) 8015 25.73 676.19 −9381.53 3521.93
TSOFE – TSO's load forecasting error (MWh) 8015 37.06 503.47 −9520.00 2751.00
SIGN –Imbalance sign (binary) 8015 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
pDA – Day-Ahead price (€/MWh) 8015 50.42 15.02 10.00 162.41
pUP – Upward price (€/MWh) 8015 101.56 93.43 0.00 801.70
pDN – Downward price (€/MWh) 8015 17.31 12.20 0.00 214.28
TFE – Temperature forecasting error (°C) by market zone
South 8015 −0.07 0.95 −17.35 8.05
Centre-South 8015 0.08 0.91 −18.85 5.15
Centre-North 8015 −0.10 1.24 −22.05 5.25
Sardinia 8015 0.43 1.79 −14.95 10.55
Sicily 8015 −0.18 1.05 −16.25 7.25
Table 8
Impact of the regulatory reform on the demand-side imbalance in the Italian macro-zone
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ables. Results reported in Table 10 show that our main findings are con-
firmed when using: i) the moving average of the main explanatory
variables (Column 1); ii) a log specification of the explanatory variables
to account for non-linearity (Column 2); iii) the real-time value of the
explanatory variables (Column 3).
A second potential critique of the proposed econometric analysis
might concern the choice of the dependent variable. We have chosen
to focus the analysis on the demand-side imbalance because the
regulatory reform concerned only the consumption sites. Moreover,
we decided to focus on the macro-zone South. Results reported in
Table 11 show that ourmain findings are confirmed: i) when the imbal-
ances of the intermittent renewable generation sites (wind and solar
photovoltaic plants, also subject to a single pricing scheme) are added
to the demand-side imbalance (Column 1); ii) when the analysis of
the demand-side imbalance is carried out on the macro-zone North
(Column 2); iii) when demand-side and renewable imbalances are
jointly considered for the macro-zone North (Column 3).Table 7
Drivers of the demand-side imbalance – Newey-West HAC SE.
(1) (2) (3)
pDA (24 h lag) −14.641⁎⁎⁎ −19.215⁎⁎⁎ −19.117⁎⁎⁎
(2.210) (2.296) (2.312)
pUP (24 h lag) 1.565⁎⁎⁎ 1.539⁎⁎⁎
(0.184) (0.181)
pDN (24 h lag) 12.873⁎⁎⁎ 10.607⁎⁎⁎
(1.840) (1.829)
SIGN (24 h lag) −197.450⁎⁎⁎
(30.731)
Constant 1381.300⁎⁎⁎ 1222.163⁎⁎⁎ 1319.589⁎⁎⁎
(195.946) (188.430) (184.659)
Observations 13,846 13,846 13,846
R-squared 0.566 0.581 0.587
YMDH TFE Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.Finally, we have adopted the Newey-West estimator to address the
problem of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. We want to verify
that our estimates do not depend on this choice. Hence, we take an
alternative approach to address the problem of serial correlation in
residuals. We perform a multivariate linear regression where the lags
of the dependent variable are added among the explanatory variables.
The number of lags is chosen according to the results of different resid-
ual autocorrelation tests. In other words, we add lags of the dependent
variable as far as the Ljung-Box Portmanteau (Q) test for white noise,
the Bartlett's periodogram-based test for white noise and the Breusch-
Godfrey serial correlation test simultaneously reject the null hypothesis
of serial correlation of the residues. Also this specification of the model
largely confirms our main results (Table 12).South - Pooled OLS with Newey-West HAC SE.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TREATED 268.740⁎⁎⁎ 269.085⁎⁎⁎ 268.988⁎⁎⁎ 269.038⁎⁎⁎
(35.182) (34.827) (34.609) (34.584)
REG_CHANGE −310.007⁎⁎⁎ −227.540⁎⁎⁎ −227.172⁎⁎⁎ −230.050⁎⁎⁎
(58.538) (61.998) (61.545) (61.583)
DIFF −284.553⁎⁎⁎ −283.893⁎⁎⁎ −283.758⁎⁎⁎ −283.680⁎⁎⁎
(48.134) (47.470) (47.226) (47.219)
pDA (24 h lag) −7.099⁎⁎⁎ −8.684⁎⁎⁎ −8.595⁎⁎⁎
(1.508) (1.543) (1.546)
pUP (24 h lag) 0.364⁎⁎⁎ 0.353⁎⁎⁎
(0.095) (0.096)
pDN (24 h lag) 5.601⁎⁎⁎ 5.156⁎⁎⁎
(0.937) (0.931)
SIGN (24 h lag) −46.585⁎⁎⁎
(16.634)
Constant −49.505 957.657 927.955⁎⁎⁎ 949.411⁎⁎⁎
(68.930) (0.000) (125.629) (125.940)
Observations 42,036 41,988 41,988 41,988
YMDH TFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table 11
Drivers of the demand-side imbalance – Newey-West HAC SE with alternative specifica-
tions of the dependent variable.
(1) (2) (3)
pDA (24 h lag) −6.241⁎ −8.077⁎⁎⁎ 2.954
(3.185) (1.969) (2.611)
pUP (24 h lag) 2.010⁎⁎⁎ −0.068 0.031
(0.279) (0.175) (0.207)
pDN (24 h lag) 13.510⁎⁎⁎ 13.364⁎⁎⁎ 16.662⁎⁎⁎
(2.683) (1.803) (2.036)
SIGN (24 h lag) −295.055⁎⁎⁎ −319.448⁎⁎⁎ −347.861⁎⁎⁎
(43.501) (34.211) (39.479)
Constant 922.011⁎⁎⁎ −293.054⁎ −1508.788⁎⁎⁎
(240.536) (162.387) (199.205)
Observations 13,846 13,846 13,846
Demand RES imbalances
in the South macrozone
x
Demand imbalances in the
North macrozone
x
Demand RES imbalances
in the North macrozone
x
YMDH TFE Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎ p b 0.1.
Table 9
Impact of the regulatory change on the demand-side imbalance in the Italian macro-zone
South – Panel regression with fixed effects and robust SE.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TREATED – – – –
REG_CHANGE −311.041 −228.069 −228.763 −232.083
(267.242) (170.400) (165.895) (173.855)
DIFF −284.553⁎⁎⁎ −284.251⁎⁎⁎ −284.251⁎⁎⁎ −284.251⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
pDA (24 h lag) −7.063 −8.670 −8.520
(8.436) (9.496) (9.138)
pUP (24 h lag) 0.335 0.322
(0.412) (0.380)
pDN (24 h lag) 5.729 5.348
(3.802) (2.888)
SIGN (24 h lag) −41.192
(98.720)
Constant 269.179 682.298 640.096 660.359
(105.188) (382.700) (333.704) (382.269)
Observations 42,036 41,988 41,988 41,988
YMDH TFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
762 S. Clò, E. Fumagalli / Energy Economics 81 (2019) 754–764As for the second empirical model (presented in Section 3.2),
additional analyses have been developed to test the robustness of our
results to alternative specifications of the DiD design. Specifically, we
find our main results to be confirmed under a different specification of
the control variables and of the dependent variable. In the former
case, the main results of the DiD regression are confirmed when the
moving average (Column 1), the logarithmic form (Column 2) and the
real value of the control (market prices and sign) variables (Column
3) are used instead of their 24 h lagged values (Table 13). In the latter
case, we find that our main results are valid when we analyze the
demand imbalances registered both in the South and in the North
macro-zones. As reported in Table 14, this holds under both a pooled
OLS with Newey-West SE (Column 1) and a panel regression with
fixed effects (Column 2).
Finally, we show that our results are robust to an alternative specifi-
cation of the estimator. We adopt a GLS approach to correct for
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation in the standard errors. Indeed,
the diagnostic Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data rejects
the null hypothesis, pointing to the presence of serial correlation, and
the result of theWald test also rejects the null hypothesis and concludes
for the presence of heteroscedasticity (Table 15). In light of theseTable 10
Drivers of the demand-side imbalance – Newey-West HAC SE with alternative specifica-
tions of the explanatory variables.
(1) (2) (3)
pDA −40.927⁎⁎⁎ −846.247⁎⁎⁎ −18.673⁎⁎⁎
(4.425) (128.643) (2.267)
pUP 4.901⁎⁎⁎ 4.751 1.346⁎⁎⁎
(0.686) (9.358) (0.181)
pDN 18.241⁎⁎⁎ 136.337⁎⁎⁎ 9.399⁎⁎⁎
(5.932) (22.307) (1.759)
SIGN −30.635 −305.739⁎⁎⁎ −238.965⁎⁎⁎
(94.431) (44.943) (30.406)
Constant 2312.131⁎⁎⁎ 3690.650⁎⁎⁎ 1482.429⁎⁎⁎
(276.251) (522.734) (189.988)
Observations 13,869 13,846 13,846
YMDH TFE Yes Yes Yes
Moving average of explanatory
variables
x
Log form of explanatory variables x
Real-time explanatory variables x
Standard errors in parentheses. **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.results, we use feasible generalized least squares which allows for ro-
bust estimations in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelationwithin panels
and heteroskedasticity across panels. Again, results presented in
Table 16 widely confirm our findings.
6. Conclusions
In light of the current energy transition, the institutional settings
governing imbalance settlements have a prominent role in fostering
market agents' responsibility in balancing powermarkets. Nevertheless,
the two dominant imbalance pricing rules currently adopted in
European markets provide rather different economic incentives in this
regard. By penalizing any deviation from energy programs, a dual pric-
ing scheme induces BRPs to minimize their individual imbalances.
Differently, by rewarding deviations that reduce the market imbalance,
a single pricing scheme creates more opportunities for BRPs to profit-
ably over- and under-schedule ahead of the time of delivery, condition-
ally on their capacity to help the system to be balanced.
The idea that a profit maximizing BRP coherently responds to such
economic incentives and exploits arbitrage opportunities on sequential
markets, emerges clearly from the theoretical model. Using an original
empirical approach, in combination with Italian market data, thisTable 12
Drivers of the demand-side imbalance – OLS with lagged dependent variable.
(1) (2) (3)
pDA (24 h lag) −0.260 −0.784⁎⁎ −0.817⁎⁎
(0.376) (0.391) (0.387)
pUP (24 h lag) 0.164⁎⁎⁎ 0.159⁎⁎⁎
(0.045) (0.045)
pDN (24 h lag) 1.353⁎⁎⁎ 0.352
(0.318) (0.321)
SIGN (24 h lag) −91.303⁎⁎⁎
(6.642)
Constant 5.407 −4.304 41.723
(33.004) (33.155) (32.968)
Observations 13,798 13,798 13,798
YMDH TFE Yes Yes Yes
DepVar Number of lags 72 72 72
Standard errors in parentheses. *p b 0.1.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
Table 13
DiD – Pooled OLS with Newey-West HAC SE and alternative specifications of the control
variables.
(1) (2) (3)
TREATED 269.655⁎⁎⁎ 270.650⁎⁎⁎ 268.501⁎⁎⁎
(34.191) (34.768) (34.506)
REG_CHANGE −160.844⁎⁎ −261.439⁎⁎⁎ −218.078⁎⁎⁎
(65.055) (63.457) (61.467)
DIFF −283.868⁎⁎⁎ −282.732⁎⁎⁎ −284.131⁎⁎⁎
(47.253) (47.568) (47.105)
pDA −14.567⁎⁎⁎ −294.928⁎⁎⁎ −9.138⁎⁎⁎
(2.367) (74.693) (1.552)
pUP 1.310⁎⁎⁎ −8.410⁎⁎ 0.314⁎⁎⁎
(0.413) (3.873) (0.095)
pDN 9.495⁎⁎⁎ 55.012⁎⁎⁎ 3.975⁎⁎⁎
(2.718) (10.207) (0.943)
SIGN −86.475⁎ −84.516⁎⁎⁎ −66.508⁎⁎⁎
(47.858) (24.403) (16.466)
Constant 1129.125⁎⁎⁎ 1296.006⁎⁎⁎ 981.524
(156.982) (331.041) (0.000)
Observations 41,982 41,988 41,988
vce robust robust robust
YMDH TFE YES YES YES
Moving average of explanatory
variables⁎
x
Log form of explanatory variables⁎ x
Real-time explanatory variables⁎ x
Standard errors in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
Table 15
Diagnostic tests on residuals.
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
F(1, 1) = 175.775
Prob N F = 0.0479
Wald test for heteroskedasticity
chi2 (2) = 723.62
Prob N chi2 = 0
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that the incentives provided under a dual pricing scheme are better
aligned with the normative responsibility of a BRP.
Indeed, an institutional arrangement where the normative frame-
work establishes a responsibility ‘to be balanced’, while the economic
incentives foster the creation of intentional imbalances (although in
principle, in the direction of helping the system to be in balance) can
lead to unnecessary system costs, and expose power systems to
extreme behavior and instability particularly when loopholes are
found in the local market design. Nevertheless, the opportunity to
benefit from a programming decision that supports the system's
stability is particularly relevant for those markets agents (consumersTable 14
DiD – Pooled OLS with Newey-West HAC SE and Panel regression with fixed effect and
alternative specifications of the dependent variable: South North.
(1) (2)
TREATED 192.220⁎⁎⁎ –
(10.163)
REG_CHANGE −75.884⁎⁎⁎ −55.738⁎⁎⁎
(14.268) (13.889)
DIFF −57.001⁎⁎⁎ −57.001⁎⁎⁎
(11.973) (11.842)
pDA (24 h lag) −5.054⁎⁎⁎ −7.519⁎⁎⁎
(0.356) (0.260)
pUP (24 h lag) 0.621⁎⁎⁎ 0.746⁎⁎⁎
(0.041) (0.040)
pDN (24 h lag) 7.972⁎⁎⁎ 7.855⁎⁎⁎
(0.341) (0.305)
SIGN (24 h lag) −130.200⁎⁎⁎ −129.728⁎⁎⁎
(7.339) (6.094)
Constant −88.780 410.763⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (28.508)
Observations 83,976 83,976
YMDH TFE Yes Yes
Pooled OLS with Newey-West SE x
Panel regression with fixed effects x
Standard errors in parentheses. **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.and intermittent renewable generation resources) who are not
yet allowed to participate in BalancingMarkets and, therefore, excluded
from the provision of balancing resources and related potential profits.
These conflicting requirements might be reconciled with the
opening of BalancingMarkets to demand-side and renewable resources
(an ongoing process at the European level) and the concomitant
adoption of a dual pricing scheme, whereby BRPs are unmistakably
given incentives to define their energy programs diligently and pru-
dently. In the meantime, the normative framework should clarify that,
although the economic incentives are present, the core responsibility
of a BRP lays in minimizing its individual imbalance. Similarly, BRPs
should be aware that responding to market signals is a strategy which,
although expected from an economic agent, also needs to be exercised
within the scope and boundaries of the normative framework.
The implications of this study are somehow in contrast with a
European framework that gives preference to single pricing schemes
(EU, 2017). For this and other reasons, further research directions
are worth investigation. While this paper studied the differential im-
pact of the two imbalance pricing schemes in terms of programming
accuracy, an interesting extension would look into welfare-related
issues, such as their impact on BRPs' and TSOs' balancing costs.
Also, in the same direction, it would be interesting to explore the
welfare effect of shifting a potentially significant volume of energy
transactions from more liquid and competitive Day-Ahead markets
tomore concentrated and volatile BalancingMarkets. Finally, market
agents and regulator alike would benefit from a better understand-
ing of whether a line should be drawn (and where), between
responding to market signals and abusive behavior. All this would
contribute to the design of efficient, secure and less carbon intensive
power markets.Table 16
Impact of the regulatory reform on the demand-side imbalance in the Italian macro-zone
South – Generalized Least Squares Panel regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TREATED 275.448⁎⁎⁎ 274.833⁎⁎⁎ 273.832⁎⁎⁎ 273.649⁎⁎⁎
(42.895) (42.076) (39.007) (38.464)
REG_CHANGE −155.840⁎⁎ −142.227⁎⁎ −139.968⁎⁎ −142.705⁎⁎
(61.534) (62.433) (57.285) (56.998)
DIFF −303.874⁎⁎⁎ −302.752⁎⁎⁎ −299.723⁎⁎⁎ −299.237⁎⁎⁎
(72.485) (71.084) (65.953) (65.047)
pDA (24 h lag) −1.647⁎⁎⁎ −1.871⁎⁎⁎ −1.875⁎⁎⁎
(0.320) (0.324) (0.324)
pUP (24 h lag) 0.005 0.003
(0.025) (0.025)
pDN (24 h lag) 1.045⁎⁎⁎ 1.031⁎⁎⁎
(0.219) (0.220)
SIGN (24 h lag) −9.435⁎⁎
(4.207)
Constant 209.228⁎ 280.831⁎⁎ 263.038⁎⁎ 269.927⁎⁎⁎
(111.033) (113.049) (104.235) (103.704)
Observations 42,036 41,988 41,988 41,988
YMDH TFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
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